On December 19, 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment in the case of State of U.P. & Anr. v. Mohd Arshad Khan & Anr. (2025 INSC 1480). Vide the said judgment, the Hon’ble Court set aside the Allahabad High Court’s directions that had granted interim protection from arrest to the accused and imposed a 90-day timeline for completion of investigation while declining to quash the FIR, holding that such blanket interim orders impermissibly interfere with lawful police investigation and amount to granting anticipatory bail without compliance with Section 438 of the CrPC.
The case originated from an FIR registered on May 24, 2025, at Police Station Nai Ki Mandi, District Agra (Case Crime No. 33 of 2025), alleging offences of cheating, forgery of valuable security, using forged documents as genuine, and violations under the Arms Act, 1959. The accusations involved the procurement of multiple arms licenses using forged documents, false affidavits, and altered personal details (such as date of birth) to avail undue benefits, including the import of prohibited arms. One of the accused was a former Arms Clerk implicated in facilitating the irregularities.
The accused approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 seeking quashing of the FIR and interim protection. The High Court declined to quash the FIR but issued the impugned directions of protection from arrest, relying on its earlier decision in Shobhit Nehra v. State of U.P. (Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 7463 of 2024).
A two-judge bench comprising Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Karol (authoring the judgment) and Hon’ble Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh allowed the appeals filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Court heavily relied on Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401), holding that granting blanket orders of “no arrest” or “no coercive steps” while dismissing quashing petitions is tantamount to granting anticipatory bail without satisfying the rigorous conditions under Section 438 CrPC. Such directions obstruct lawful investigation and are legally impermissible.
The Hon’ble Court further clarified that timelines for completion of investigation should be imposed only reactively—in cases of undue delay or stagnation—and not prophylactically as a routine measure. The 90-day deadline lacked justification on the facts and was accordingly quashed. The Court distinguished the High Court’s reliance on Shobhit Nehra, noting that precedents must be applied only to analogous factual situations.
While setting aside the protection from arrest, the Hon’ble Court granted interim relief by directing that no coercive action be taken against the accused for two weeks from the date of judgment to enable them to seek appropriate remedies.
This judgment reiterates the balance between protecting individual liberty and ensuring unhindered police investigation in serious offences, cautioning High Courts towards routinely passing such interim directions in quashing petitions under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution.