On November 24, 2025, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi made an important ruling in Naresh Bansal & Ors. v. Adjudicating Authority & Anr. (W.P.(C) 11361/2015 and connected matters). The court dismissed six writ petitions that challenged the Enforcement Directorate’s Provisional Attachment Orders (PAOs) and related proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA).
The petitions addressed the attachment of properties linked to a large international cricket betting and hawala operation. This network allegedly used the UK-based portal Betfair.com and generated proceeds of crime exceeding ₹2,469 crores from 2014 to 2015. The ED claimed that the petitioners obtained and distributed illegal “Super Master Login IDs” and facilitated hawala transactions and betting settlements. This included receiving ₹60.71 crores as part of the illegal proceeds.
A Division Bench consisting of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar reviewed whether the PAOs, Original Complaints, and Show Cause Notices under Sections 5 and 8 of PMLA were valid.
The Court explained that although part of the cause for action arose in Delhi—since some transactions and searches happened there—the petitions could not be maintained. This was due to the availability of an effective legal remedy under PMLA. Citing Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, the Bench emphasized that writ courts should not interfere unless there is a clear violation of fundamental rights, natural justice, or jurisdictional error. The Court also warned against the increasing trend of bypassing PMLA’s adjudicatory process and approaching the High Court directly during the provisional attachment stage.
The petitioners claimed that the ED had not established a proper “reason to believe” while issuing the PAO. The Court dismissed this claim, stating that the ED had substantial evidence, including the FIR, DCB Mumbai’s chargesheet, bank records, ledgers, and statements under Section 50 PMLA. In the Court’s opinion, these materials provided a valid basis for the necessary belief.
A central issue was whether “cricket betting” is a scheduled offense and if proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) could arise from it. The Court firmly rejected this argument, stating that:
The IDs were obtained, operated, and distributed using forged documents, along with cheating and criminal conspiracy—all of which are scheduled IPC offenses.
Property that is directly or indirectly linked to criminal activity involving a scheduled offense remains tainted.
Even if betting itself is not a scheduled offense, profits from property obtained through scheduled offenses still count as proceeds of crime.
The Court characterized this idea as the legal equivalent of the “fruit of the poisoned tree” principle.
The petitioners also contested the Show Cause Notices, arguing that the Adjudicating Authority (AA) was operating as a single-member bench. The Court clarified that Section 6 of PMLA allows the AA to function as a single-member, two-member, or full bench. Therefore, the AA was not acting outside its jurisdiction.
The Court further stated that a Show Cause Notice under Section 8 does not require the prior attachment of the recipient’s property, as the three legal triggers operate independently.
All writ petitions and pending applications were dismissed. The Court emphasized that its observations were limited to the matter of maintainability and a preliminary review, and would not affect further decisions by the statutory authorities.
This judgment reinforces the judicial tendency to avoid interference at early stages of PMLA cases, confirms the broad interpretation of “proceeds of crime,” and upholds the ED’s powers, including issuing attachment orders and SCNs based on evidence showing indirect involvement in money-laundering activities.