The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, held that the right to walk on a demarcated footpath is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution that includes the right to access safe and well-demarcated footpaths. The Apex court has placed the right to walk on a footpath on a higher pedestal than the right to movement by motorised vehicle. The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the constitutional guarantee of freedom of movement encompasses a corresponding right to access safe, demarcated, and well-maintained footpaths, and whether such rights should receive precedence over motorised vehicular movement. The Court further examined the duties of public authorities in ensuring pedestrian infrastructure and the remedies available in cases of violation of such rights.
The case arose out of a motor accident claim involving the tragic death of a five-year-old child who was struck by a tanker while walking to school with his father. The father filed a compensation claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal seeking ₹25,00,000. While the Tribunal awarded compensation of ₹7,82,000 with interest, the High Court subsequently reduced the amount to ₹4,70,000. Aggrieved by the reduction, the matter reached the Supreme Court. During the adjudication of the compensation claim, the Court considered broader questions relating to pedestrian rights and road safety, observing that the absence of safe pedestrian infrastructure significantly contributes to such incidents.
Evaluating the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court undertook a constitutional analysis of the right to movement under Article 19(1)(d), read together with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c), and Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court observed that walking is inextricably connected with daily life and remains the most basic mode of human movement. It noted that urban planning and transportation policies have increasingly prioritised motorised vehicles, resulting in pedestrians being pushed to the margins of public spaces. The Court remarked that walking has become “invisible to the light” and that footpaths, where they exist, are often encroached upon or subordinated to vehicular traffic. Recognising this imbalance, the Court declared that the right to walk necessarily includes the right to access demarcated and well-maintained footpaths and that such rights must enjoy priority over the movement of motorised vehicles.
The Court further held that the recognition of a fundamental right to walk carries a corresponding public duty. Urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities, and panchayats are under an obligation to demarcate, construct, maintain, and safeguard footpaths and other pedestrian infrastructure. The Bench clarified that where roads exist, authorities must ensure the availability of safe pedestrian pathways. The Court also recognised that the violation of this right would entitle citizens to invoke constitutional and legal remedies against the responsible authorities, including claims for restitution and compensation. Such remedies, the Court held, are independent of and in addition to those available under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and enhanced the compensation payable to the father of the deceased child to ₹11,44,628, directing payment within two months. More significantly, the Court declared that the right to walk on demarcated footpaths forms an integral part of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution and that pedestrian rights must receive primacy in public infrastructure planning. The judgment represents a significant step towards recognising pedestrian safety, accessibility, and dignity as constitutional imperatives while imposing a corresponding obligation upon public authorities to create and preserve adequate pedestrian infrastructure.