The case is between Yash Mahesh Gaikwad and the State of Maharashtra, arising out of a series of appeals concerning the grant and refusal of regular bail to various accused in a case involving a premeditated and fatal attack. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court and the Trial Court had properly exercised their discretion while granting bail to certain accused, particularly where the material on record prima facie indicated their involvement in a concerted attack that resulted in the complainant being set on fire. The case also raised an important question of law concerning the extent to which the principle of parity can be invoked in bail matters, especially where the order granting bail to a co-accused is inadequately reasoned.
The case arose from an FIR registered in June 2024 in Satara, Maharashtra, concerning murder, attempt to murder, abetment and criminal intimidation. The deceased was allegedly assaulted following a dispute relating to his son’s marriage and was later tied up, doused with petrol and set ablaze, resulting in his death. During investigation, three alleged accomplices were identified through a test identification parade, CCTV footage and mobile video recordings. The Trial Court and High Court granted bail to certain accused, which was challenged before the Supreme Court. The principal issue was whether the bail orders properly considered the gravity of the offence and the prima facie involvement of the respective accused.
The Supreme Court distinguished accused No. 5 from accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4, observing that there was no material showing his presence at the spot and the case against him was largely circumstantial. Hence, his bail was not disturbed. However, the bail granted to accused Nos. 3 and 4 was cancelled as the courts below had failed to consider material indicating their participation in the attack and common intention. The Court particularly held that parity cannot be mechanically applied when the order granting bail to the alleged co-accused is itself legally unsustainable. It reiterated that, in serious offences such as murder, bail orders must demonstrate proper application of mind to the nature and gravity of the allegations and the accused’s prima facie role. Accordingly, accused Nos. 3 and 4 were directed to surrender, while accused No. 5 was permitted to remain on bail, and the trial was directed to be completed within two years.
The judgment is significant for the manner in which it reinforces the requirement of judicial discretion while considering bail in serious criminal cases. The Supreme Court has clarified that bail cannot be granted as a matter of routine where the charge-sheet discloses allegations of a grave and premeditated offence and the material on record prima facie indicates a common intention among the accused. More importantly, the Court has held that the principle of parity does not constitute an independent ground for granting bail and cannot be relied upon to sustain an improper or inadequately reasoned bail order. At the same time, the Court’s decision to retain the bail granted to one accused while cancelling the bail of the others underscores that the grant of bail must be assessed on the individual facts and circumstances of each accused, rather than being governed by a uniform approach towards all co-accused.