The case is between Mohseen and The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., embodying a critical question of Law, i.e., Whether a High Court can validly grant bail to an accused whose prior bail was cancelled by the Supreme Court without showing a change in factual circumstances or engaging with the reasons for the initial cancellation, and whether the absence of a firearm injury negates an attempt to murder charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code.
The fact of the case was that the Appellant’s brother was murdered by certain individuals, after which the Appellant was continuously threatened within court premises by the co-accused to force a compromise. Subsequently, on 12th May, 2024, the accused persons intercepted the Appellant’s uncle and cousin, demanding they withdraw the murder case before assaulting them. CCTV footage and eyewitness accounts established that Respondent No. 2 retrieved a country-made pistol from his house and fired multiple shots from a nearby roof with the intent to kill, though no firearm injuries were sustained. Following his arrest, the High Court initially granted him bail by mischaracterizing his role as “vague and general,” an order the Supreme Court promptly set aside on 27th January, 2025, with instructions to surrender forthwith. Instead of complying, Jeeshan absconded for 42 days, evading non-bailable warrants and police raids until statutory proclamation proceedings were initiated. After finally surrendering, he filed a fresh bail application, which the High Court allowed on 22nd September, 2025, citing a delay in the FIR, the absence of firearm injuries, and the principle of parity with a co-accused who had been granted bail.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order suffered from a manifest error of law and was entirely perverse. The Court emphasized that while there is no absolute bar against a High Court granting bail after a prior cancellation by the apex court, such an order must be supported by fresh grounds or a distinct change in circumstances, neither of which existed here. The Court strongly rebuked the accused’s contumacious conduct in absconding, clarifying that filing a review petition does not act as an automatic stay on a surrender order. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a charge under Section 307 IPC only requires an act done with the intent or knowledge that it could cause death, the fact that the victims escaped injury by chance does not negate the offense. The Court also rejected the principle of parity, noting that Jeeshan had a distinct and active role as the shooter and faced additional charges under the Arms Act. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, cancelled Jeeshan’s bail, and directed him to surrender immediately.
The significance of this case lies in its reinforcement of judicial discipline and the protection of victims and witnesses within the criminal justice system. It firmly establishes that subordinate courts must meticulously engage with superior court rulings and cannot casually grant bail in serious matters using boilerplate language or unreflective applications of parity. By clarifying that actual physical injury is not a prerequisite to sustain an attempt to murder charge under Section 307 IPC, the Supreme Court closed a technical loophole often exploited by defence counsels. Most importantly, the ruling highlights that the continuous evasion of law enforcement and the intimidation of witnesses trying to pursue justice are critical, gravity-multiplying factors that decisively outweigh an accused person’s plea for personal liberty.